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NOTES
FLEXIBLE MOOTNESS IN CLASS CERTIFICATIONC LASS ACTIONS HAVE LONG BEEN RECOGNIZED as a powerful proce-
dural device that allows an entire class of plaintiffs to resolve their
claims in a single proceeding.1 While the purposes of class actions are
easy to comprehend, the actual application and requirements of Rule 23
are complex.' Before the suit may proceed, it must be certified by the
' Class actions were used in English law 300 years ago. See 3B MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.01.
2 The purposes of FED. R. Civ. P. 23 include the conservation of time, effort,
and expense and the provision of a forum for claimants whose individual claims
would be too small for the expense of litigation. To receive the benefits that class
status brings to a suit, the rule sets up a substantial list of prerequisites in (a)
and (b) and requires court certification of the class in (c)(1). These sections of the
rule read as follow:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the
class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2)
there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members
of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards
of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of
the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially
impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final in-
junctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the
class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only in-
dividual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The
matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of
the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
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trial court.' Although Rule 23 carefully lists the criteria for the court to
consider, certification is not a predictable outcome.' If it is denied, the
action is then litigated solely on the claims of the named plaintiffs.
Under certain circumstances the denial would signal the end of the suit.'
Such an instance would occur if the named plaintiff's claims had become
moot.' His action would no longer satisfy the "case or controversy" re-
quirement for adjudication in the federal courts.' For such a plaintiff an
appeal of the denial would be vital to maintain his cause, yet it is not
clear whether this plaintiff even has sufficient "case or controversy" to
maintain an appeal." In 1980 the Supreme Court issued two decisions9 to
address this question and extended its doctrine of "flexible mootness"
in class actions.10 This article will examine the history of this problem,
claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be en-
countered in the management of a class action.
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Maintained; ...
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought
as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be
so maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and
may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.
Id. An analysis of the problems presented to the courts by these sections appears
in Miller, An Overview of Federal Class Actions: Past, Present, and Future, 4
JUST. SYS. J. 197 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Miller].
I For the text of FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1), see note 2 supra. The importance of
certification has been recognized by both the courts and commentators. See
Miller, supra note 2, at 199, and note 22 infra.
' Both justices and commentators have noted that despite similar cir-
cumstances a class may be certified in one suit and not in another. See Bd. of
School Comm'rs of Indianapolis v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128, 132-133 (1974) (Douglas,
J., dissenting). See generally Miller, supra note 2.
See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen I), 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966).
See also Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
1 The "named plaintiff' is the party who brings the suit on behalf of the class.
Throughout this article the term "mooted plaintiff' will be used to refer to a
"named plaintiff' whose individual claims have become moot.
' "Case or controversy" is required in all federal lawsuits by Art. III of the
U.S. Constitution.
' The federal courts of appeals have been divided in their handling of such
cases. Cases such as Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd
sub nom, Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980) and Geraghty v.
United States Parole Comm'n, 579 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1978), aff'd, 445 U.S. 388
(1980), found that the named plaintiff could appeal despite the mootness of his
own claims, while cases such as Winokur v. Bell Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 560 F.2d
271 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978) and Napier v. Gertrude, 542
F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1049 (1977) found the opposite.
' The Supreme Court issued two opinions on March 19, 1980, dealing with
this problem: Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980), and United
States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
0 "Flexible mootness" was recognized by the Supreme Court in Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). It first appeared in a class action context in the case of
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the opinions of the Court, and possible ramifications of the Court's deci-
sions."
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Sosna Doctrine
The Supreme Court began to develop its doctrine of "flexible
mootness" when it issued the Sosna v. Iowa"2 decision in 1975. Carol
Sosna moved to Iowa in August, 1972, and the following month filed for
a dissolution of her marriage. The Iowa court dismissed her suit because
she did not satisfy the residency requirement of one year for divorce ac-
tions under Iowa law. In response to this dismissal, Sosna brought a
class action in federal district court, alleging that the Iowa durational
residency requirement violated both her constitutional rights and the
rights of the "class of those residents of the State of Iowa who have
resided therein for a period of less than one year and who desire to in-
itiate actions for dissolution of marriage. . . ."" As the suit proceeded
through the federal courts, Sosna's personal claims became moot once
she obtained her divorce in another state and, through the passage of
time, satisified the one-year residency requirement. The issue in the
federal courts then became Sosna's right to maintain a class action when
she personally lacked the necessary "case or controversy" for federal
justiciability.
Writing for a majority of the Supreme Court, Justice Rehnquist found
the case not to be moot. "Although the controversy is no longer alive as
to appellant Sosna, it remains very much alive for the class of persons
she has been certified to represent."" Mbotness in such an instance
would not terminate a class proceeding so long as the action satisfied
four prerequisites: (1) certification of the class; (2) active controversy
between the representative plaintiff and defendant at the time of the
class certification; (3) continuing controversy between the unnamed
plaintiffs and defendant after the named plaintiff's claims had been
mooted; and (4) a controversy "capable of repetition, yet evading
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975). In that case the Supreme Court decided that
the mootness of the named plaintiff's claims was not fatal to the continuation of
the class suit. Thus, for a class action the doctrine of mootness was no longer a
hard and fast rule but one that could be applied flexibly. See notes 12-18 infra and
accompanying text.
11 This article will not discuss the history of mootness as it has been
developed by the Supreme Court; numerous articles have already done so. See,
e.g., Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 88 HARV. L. REV. 373
(1974); Note, A Search for Principles of Mootness in the Federal Courts, 54 TEX.
L. REV. 1289 (1976).
12 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
13 Id. at 397.
" Id. at 401.
19811
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1981
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
review."'" Thus, for a class that had already been certified, Sosna focus-
ed primarily on the claims of the class, not those of the named plaintiffs.
As for the effect of mootness on the certification process, Sosna had
little to say. While the Court noted the importance of certification, it did
not formulate a clear rule to handle these cases. In a footnote the Court
stated:
There may be cases in which the controversy involving the nam-
ed plaintiffs is such that it becomes moot as to them before the
District Court can reasonably be expected to rule on a certifica-
tion motion. In such instances, whether the certification can be
said to "relate back" to the filing of the complaint may depend
upon the circumstances of the particular case and especially the
reality of the claim that otherwise the issue would evade
review."6
With wording as nonspecific as "depend upon the circumstances of the
particular case,"" it is not surprising how differently the lower courts
could apply the little guidance which they were given here. 8
Between 1975 and 1977 the Court issued several decisions to clarify
and restate the Sosna holding and dicta. 9 Those cases continued to em-
phasize the four requirements of Sosna, and among the requirements
class certification was considered the most basic. Without certification,
a case would not be entitled to the special treatment to avoid termina-
tion due to mootness allowed by Sosna for class actions. Thus, in Bd. of
School Comm'rs of Indianapolis v. Jacobs,2 ' the Court readily ruled the
controversy moot since the class "was never properly certified nor ...
properly identified."" Since the high school students who represented
the class had graduated, their case was mooted and terminated by their
loss of class status. It did not matter to the Court that Jacobs would
have satisfied all the other requirements of Sosna; the case had failed
the threshold test of certification. Certification was beginning to loom
15 Id. at 397-403.
'1 Id. at 402 n.11. Throughout this article this footnote will be referred to as
"the Sosna footnote."
17 Id.
'8 See notes 63-64 infra and accompanying text.
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); Bd. of School Comm'rs of Indianapolis
v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975). See East Tex. Motor Sys. Freight, Inc. v.
Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747
(1976).
2 420 U.S. 128 (1975). Six named plaintiffs who at the time of filing the suit
were enrolled as Indianapolis high school students were denied class certification
in their action to challenge the constitutionality of school board rules and regula-
tions that governed the publication and distribution of a newspaper produced by
the students.
" Id. at 130.
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as the critical step in a class actionu and one well worth fighting for by
both plaintiffs and their attorneys.
In a decision issued the same day as Jacobs the Court elaborated on
"the Sosna footnote" dealing with the "relation back" doctrine. 3 The
named plaintiffs in Gerstein v. Pugh2 ' had challenged the constitu-
tionality of pretrial detention without a preliminary hearing to deter-
mine probable cause, but prior to Supreme Court review their claims
were mooted by their trial and conviction. The record, however, did not
indicate whether mooting occurred before or after the class was cer-
tified. "5 While "[sluch a showing ordinarily would be required to avoid
mootness under Sosna, . .. this case is a suitable exception to that re-
quirement."" The exception satisfied the "circumstances" that "the
Sosna footnote" emphasized would occur when the injury was "capable
of repetition, yet evading review."' A particular individual might not be
held in pretrial custody long enough for a district judge to certify the
class, but the Court felt that "the existence of a class of persons suffer-
ing the deprivation" 2 was ongoing. Thus, the Court was able to "relate
back" the certification to the case and controversy that existed at the
time of the filing of the suit. While this was probably just an artifice to
allow the Court to review this case on its merits and to bypass any pro-
cedural problems preliminary to its substantive discussion," it became
the standard by which the exceptions to the Sosna rule were
measured." Sosna demanded certification, and mooted plaintiffs needed
to satisfy a Gerstein v. Pugh requirement to obtain that certification.
In 1976 the Court re-examined the Sosna doctrine in a case named
" Writing the opinion for the Supreme Court in Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v.
Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980), Chief Justice Burger stated: "A district court's ruling
on the certification issue is often the most significant decision rendered in ...
class-action proceedings." Id. at 339.
' See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
2 420 U.S. 103 (1975). The district court certified Pugh's suit as a class action.
Id. at 111 n.11.
SId.
The idea that cases "capable of repetition, yet evading review" should be
excepted from mootness first occurred in Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219
U.S. 498 (1911). By the time of Gerstein v. Pugh in 1975, it was a well accepted ex-
ception.
420 U.S. at 111 n.11.
The Court did not give lengthy consideration to the "relation back" prob-
lem in this case. It is covered by only one footnote. The opinion is devoted to im-
portant constitutional and criminal law principles which the Court wanted to use
this case to address. The Court ruled that pretrial hearings on probable cause
were mandatory prior to jailing criminal suspects.
8' See Vun Cannon v. Breed, 565 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1977); Boyd v. Justices of
Special Term, 546 F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1976).
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Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co."' Since the Court had established
the four requirements 2 for flexible mootness in class actions, it had
restated them but never expanded them. In Franks the claims of the
two named plaintiffs had become moot, and the defendant contended
that their mootness precluded their right to appeal. The Court pointed
out, however, that as in Sosna, once a class was certified, it "acquired a
legal status separate from the interest asserted by [the named represen-
tative]. ' u The unnamed members of the class had a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy, and the appeal was justiciable. The defend-
ant then argued that the injury must be "capable of repetition, yet
evading review" to benefit from Sosna's flexible mootness. At this point
the Supreme Court liberalized Sosna by declaring that Sosna did not re-
quire such a type of controversy. In that case the Court had "cited with
approval two Courts of Appeals decisions not involving 'evading review'
issues which [had] held . . . that . . . claims of unnamed class members
[were] not automatically mooted merely because the named represen-
tative [was] . . . ineligible for relief for reasons particular to his in-
dividual claim."'
This expansion of Sosna was favorable to mooted plaintiffs in appeal-
ing the denial of class certification. Technically it freed them from part
of the Gerstein v. Pugh requirement. 5 Certification could still "relate
back" to the case and controversy that existed at the time of the filing
of the suit, but the injury no longer had to be "capable of repetition, yet
evading review." Future mooted plaintiffs such as Geraghty were to
find this holding to be significant in their appeals.
36
After relaxing the Sosna doctrine in Franks, the Court used East
Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez37 to restate its holding
in Jacobs.38 In a suit similar to Franks', Rodriguez alleged that black and
Mexican-American truck drivers were discriminated against by East
Texas' seniority and no-transfer policy between city and line drivers. 39
31 424 U.S. 747 (1976). Franks and Lee, the named plaintiffs, represented a
class of black truck drivers who alleged that Bowman had discriminated against
them in hiring. Although the class won on that issue, it did not receive the
specific relief that it had requested so it appealed in order to gain retroactive
seniority status according to the date of the employment applications. By the
time of the appeal neither Franks nor Lee was still employed by Bowman. Id.
' See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
1 424 U.S. 747, 753, quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399 (1975).
11 424 U.S. at 754 n.7.
See notes 23-30 supra and accompanying text.
See Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, 579 F.2d 238, 244-46 (3d Cir.
1978), affd, 445 U.S. 388, 398 n.6 (1980).
37 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
1 See notes 20-22 supra and accompanying text.
" A line driver was not allowed to count time spent on other jobs in the com-
[Vol. 30:295
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Unlike Franks, however, no class was certified by the district court in
East Texas because the named plaintiffs did not file a motion for cer-
tification, and the court at trial found that no class existed. The named
plaintiffs did not meet the qualifications to be line drivers, and therefore
lost on the merits of their individual claims. On appeal the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and certified the class." While defer-
ring the question of whether an appellate court could certify a class, the
Supreme Court ruled that "the Court of Appeals ... erred in certifying
a class in this case, for the simple reason that ... by the time the case
reached the court . . . the named plaintiffs were not proper class
representatives.""' Since their alleged injury did not result from racial
discrimination but from their lack of qualifications, they could not repre-
sent a class of racial discriminatees.
In reaching its decision, the court did not find it necessary to rely on
Sosna or any of the Sosna-line of cases. Because of this decision's
similarity to Jacobs, it was surprising that the court did not cite that
case in support of its holding. Both suits, according to the court, were
virtually terminated by the denial of class certification, and the mooted
plaintiffs were not allowed to appeal. Thus, this case was easily
distinguishable from ones like Franks where the class was originally
certified by the trial court and could appeal as a class based on that cer-
tification. Perhaps by 1977 the Supreme Court foresaw the future split
in the circuits' handling of such cases'2 and wanted to reaffirm its posi-
tion in Jacobs. By citing other decisions, it might have tried to
strengthen its holding. Jacobs had been merely a per curiam opinion,
and East Texas which was unanimously decided by the Court could
stand on its own without the buttressing of a minor opinion.
B. Appealability of the Denial of Class Certification
1. The "Death Knell" Doctrine
By 1978 the principles of the Sosna case had become established in
the courts, and the Supreme Court was ready to focus on another aspect
of class certification. If class status were denied, when could the issue
properly be appealed? Since 1966 the "death knell doctrine" had sup-
plied the answer."' Appeals to the U.S. Courts of Appeals are governed
pany toward his seniority, and a city driver was forced to resign his job in order
to be eligible for a job as a line driver.
40 505 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1974).
431 U.S. at 403.
42 See notes 85-86 infra and accompanying text.
,8 The "death knell doctrine" was first advanced in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jac-
quelin (Eisen I), 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967),
where the court found that if an order such as denial of class certification was
issued by the trial court, it could be fatal to the plaintiffs right to maintain his ac-
1981]
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by 28 U.S.C. § 1291 which stipulates that appeals can only be made from
final judgments." In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen I) the
Supreme Court found that an order denying class certification was a
"final judgment" within the meaning of the statute. If small-claim plain-
tiffs like Eisen were not allowed to appeal, their lawsuits would virtually
be terminated since their individual damage claims would not merit the
cost of litigation. By denying the named plaintiffs a right to appeal, the
courts had assured the death of their suits. To provide a remedy, the
Court allowed such plaintiffs the right to an immediate appeal under
section 1291.
In class action cases after Eisen, such as B& of School Comm'rs of In-
dianapolis v. Jacobs,"' the doctrine is suspiciously absent. For the
students who lost certification in that suit, the case was over when their
individual claims were held moot. 7 The Court, however, did not
graciously allow them to escape "the death knell" of lost certification as
it did for Eisen. To the Court the doctrine had developed into an uncon-
trollable waste of judicial resources," and in 1978 the Court terminated
the doctrine in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay.9
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court in Coopers, held that class ac-
tions are not entitled to special treatment for appeals. Prior to judg-
ment, "orders relating to class certification are not independently ap-
pealable under section 1291 .... ,I Since the named plaintiffs are able to
continue the suit of their individual claims, their cause of action has not
tion. In Eisen's case, his personal claim of $70 did not justify the legal fees and
costs of court litigation so that the court, by refusing him class certification, had
denied him legal redress. To avoid terminating the suit under such cir-
cumstances, the Supreme Court allowed Eisen to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(1958).
" 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1958) reads: "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction
of appeals from all final decisions of the United States .... except where a direct
review may be had in the Supreme Court." Id.
15 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967). Eisen alleged
antitrust violations by defendants in their real estate dealings with himself and
other odd-lot traders.
0 420 U.S. 128 (1975).
47 See notes 20, 21 supra and accompanying text.
," See discussion of this point in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463,
473 (1978); Note, Immediate Appealability of Orders Denying Class Certification:
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay and Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co.,
40 OHIO ST. L.J. 441 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Immediate Appealability].
,1 437 U.S. 463 (1978). Plaintiffs sued on behalf of a class of approximately eigh-
teen hundred stockholders who, in reliance upon a prospectus and registration
statement certified by the accounting firm of Coopers & Lybrand, had purchased
stock in a Florida land development company and who subsequently lost almost
half their investment when the company restated its earnings for two years,
thereby sharply devaluing the stock.
I Id. at 470.
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been terminated." To the lower courts this case signalled the "death
knell of the death knell doctrine.
52
In Coopers the Court never considered how its disavowal of the doc-
trine would affect mootness cases. If the class is denied certification,
"the plaintiff is free to proceed on his individual claim."' That rule is
not true for the mooted plaintiff. The issue that his case raises will
never be heard by a court, and his suit is terminated unless an appeal is
allowed. While his appeal can be brought after the dismissal of his own
suit, it would require an unusually dedicated plaintiff to risk the ex-
pense of continued litigation."
2. Injunctive Appeals
On the same day that the Court issued Coopers, it also announced
Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co.55 The plaintiff in the latter
case had been denied class certification in her employment discrimina-
tion suit, and immediately appealed, invoking the jurisdiction of the
court of appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)." She contended that "[t]he
practical effect of the denial of class certification is . . . to refuse a
substantial portion of the injunctive relief requested in the complaint.5 57
The Supreme Court summarily dismissed any such notion of appealabil-
ity.' The denial of certification was merely a pretrial procedure and not
within the scope of the statute. As in Coopers the Court was disturbed
at opening "a floodgate" of "piecemeal appeals."59
51 Id. at 467.
'2 Following Coopers, no mention is made of the "death knell doctrine" in
class action cases. For commentary on this point, see Immediate Appealability,
supra note 48.
' 437 U.S. at 467.
See, contra, Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank of Jackson v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 344
n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring): "Anyone who voluntarily engages in com-
bat- whether in the courtroom or elsewhere-must recognize that some of his
own blood may be spilled." Id. The exact extent to which Stevens feels a mooted
plaintiff should extend his personal liability is not delineated, but it is fair to say
that Stevens does not see any unusual amount of dedication involved.
11 437 U.S. 478 (1978). Gardner had unsuccessfully applied for a job as a radio
talk show host at a station owned by defendant, and brought this civil rights suit
"on behalf of herself and other females adversely affected by [defendant's] al-
leged practice of discriminating against women." Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1958) reads: "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdic-
tion of appeals from: Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United
States .... granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or
refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review may be
had in the Supreme Court." Id.
" 437 U.S. at 480.
5 Id.
11 Id. at 482.
19811
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While the Gardner case did not deal with mooted plaintiffs, it never-
theless had implications for them. In Gardner the Court stated that no
"irreparable"' harm occurred from the denial since the plaintiff could
appeal after the final judgment."1 For a mooted plaintiff, however, the
possibility of such an appeal was not guaranteed," and the Court's
refusal to hear such appeals under section 12 92 (a)(1) foreclosed another
remedy to the mooted plaintiffs appeal.
C. The Circuits Apply the Supreme Court's Mandates
Lacking clear-cut statements by the Court in how to deal with
mootness and the appealability of denied class status, the federal courts
of appeals were left to devise their own solutions. Between 1976 and
1979 seven of the circuits entered opinions on the issue," and their
disparate treatment eventually drew the attention of the Supreme
Court.6
One of the first of these cases occurred in the Tenth Circuit in Oc-
tober, 1976, when the court decided Napier v. Gertrude." Searching for
guidance, the court found its precedents in Sosna, Jacobs, and Franks."
While the court felt that the district court had erred in refusing to cer-
tify Napier's suit, it ruled that the error was not capable of correction at
this stage of the litigation. 7 Relying on "the Sosna footnote," it ruled
that courts could grant late certification only if the plaintiffs showed
that they could suffer the injury again and that the duration of the in-
jury would be too brief to permit court litigation before becoming
moot." Napier v. Gertrude did not satisfy these requirements and,
therefore, lacked the necessary "live controversy." Like the students in
I Id. at 480.
61 Id.
62 See Bd. of School Comm'rs of Indianapolis v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1974),
and Napier v. Gertrude, 542 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1976).
" The circuits involved were the second, third, fourth, fifth, seventh, ninth,
and tenth.
See Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank of Jackson v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 340 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring); United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S.
388, 390 n.2 (1980).
65 542 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1049 (1977). Napier had
been adjudged "a child in need of supervision" by an Oklahoma juvenile court and
committed to a state institution. She contended that the statute under which she
and others similarly situated were held in custody was unconstitutionally vague,
and she sought to have her suit certified as a class action on their behalf.
" Prior to 1977, these three Supreme Court decisions formed the core of
judicial doctrine dealing with mootness and appealability of denied class status.
67 542 F.2d at 827.
" Id. at 828, quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 408 n.11. See also note 27
supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 30:295
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Jacobs, Napier was no longer subject to the injury from which she
sought relief."8 No special treatment was accorded Jacobs, and no
special treatment would be granted for Napier.
Later in 1976 the Second Circuit applied similar reasoning in Boyd v.
Justices of Special Term.7 ' Thirteen indigent plaintiffs were refused
class certification in their constitutional suit for assignment of counsel
in their divorce actions." Since these plaintiffs had, by the time of their
appeal, been assigned attorneys by the Bronx office of the Legal Aid
Society, the court found their case to be moot."2 Like the Napier court,
the Second Circuit declared that the mooted plaintiffs did not qualify for
any special treatment under Sosna or Jacobs because their class was
not certified below."8 Moreover, the court found that this case did not
qualify for the "relation back" exception that Sosna and Gerstein al-
lowed."' In a footnote the court wrote pointedly that "the circumstances
leading to mootness occurred after the District Court had dismissed [the
case] and arose as the result of independent action taken by the named
plaintiffs and their counsel."75 For the relation back exception to apply,
mootness must intervene before the district court can rule on certifica-
tion, not after the case is completed.
For mooted plaintiffs such as Boyd, however, it would have been dif-
ficult to know when to apply for an appeal of the denial. Boyd, according
to the Second Circuit, waited too long, but if Boyd had appealed prior to
final judgment, she would have had to appeal under either sections 1291 or
1292(a)(1).78 As the Coopers and Gardner courts were to rule two years
later," plaintiffs seeking review of their denied class status were not
eligible for such appeals but were directed to wait until after final judg-
ment. While Boyd brought mootness on herself by her "independent ac-
tion," 8 and may have seemed undeserving of special treatment, not all
mooted plaintiffs have produced their own mootness.7 8
In 1977 the appellate cases'0 that dealt with the appealability of
89 542 F.2d at 828.
70 546 F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1976).
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
78 See notes 44 and 56 supra.
71 See notes 49-62 supra and accompanying text.
78 546 F.2d 526, 527 n.2 (2d Cir. 1976).
7' Sosna, for instance, fulfilled the residency requirement of Iowa's divorce
law merely by continuing to live in the state for three months. She did not have
to take "independent action" to render her action moot.
o Winokur v. Bell Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 560 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978); Banks v. Multi-Family Management, Inc., 554 F.2d
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denied class status by mooted plaintiffs continued to follow "the Sosna
footnote" and the Jacobs holding. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Vun
Cannon v. Breed"1 provided summaries of the other circuits' opinions 2
while epitomizing their holdings in its own. According to what the court
called "a formidable array of post-Sosna-Jacobs decisions,"" the Ninth
Circuit duly held that "unless there are present unusual facts bringing
the matter within the narrow exception countenanced by footnote 11 of
Sosna and Gerstein v. Pugh," the mooted plaintiff has no standing to
appeal the denial of class certification. While the court had made its
decision to be consistent with the Supreme Court holdings, it openly
declared its dislike of their doctrine.85 Although the Ninth Circuit would
not be one of the two circuits to reject the doctrine, it had started to lay
the foundation for its demise.
In 1978 the unity of the circuits was broken when the Fifth and Third
Circuits held that, for the purpose of appealing denied class certifica-
tion, the mootness of the named plaintiff could be overlooked under cer-
tain conditions. The Fifth Circuit showed signs of its future split from
the majority rule when it issued its opinion in Satterwhite v. City of
Greenville8 on August 23, 1978.
Mrs. Satterwhite had applied for the position of airport manager in
Greenville. She was not hired, and after a male was hired, she filed a
class action alleging sex discrimination in the city's employment prac-
tices. The city countered that she was rejected because of an obvious
conflict of interest since her husband's business was the primary user of
the airport. Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court
denied class certification. At trial Satterwhite lost and on appeal a panel
of Fifth Circuit judges affirmed, but reversed the denial of certification,
127 (4th Cir. 1977); Vun Cannon v. Breed, 565 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1977); Kuahulu v.
Employers Ins. of Wausau, 557 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977); Lasky v. Quinlan, 558
F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1977); Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 559 F.2d 209
(3d Cir. 1977).
"1 565 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1977). At commencement of the suit, Vun Cannon,
the named plaintiff, was in the custody of the California Youth Authority. By
statute the Youth Authority had the power to transfer its wards to particular
vocational institutions. Vun Cannon challenged the statute on civil rights grounds
and sought class certification. The district court denied certification based on
plaintiff's lack of standing to represent the class since he had already been
transferred to a state vocational institution. By the time of appeal for denial of
class certification, he had been discharged from the custody of the Youth
Authority, and the Ninth Circuit found his right to appeal moot.
Id. at 1099 n.5.
Id. at 1098.
u Id. at 1100.
The Ninth Circuit refers to the rule established by the Supreme Court in
Sosna and its subsequent cases as "smack[ing].. .of metaphysics" and grudging-
ly says that it must "adopt such logic." Id. at 1099.
" 578 F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1978).
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remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing. 7 This panel decision for
remand was vacated by the circuit sitting en banc."
Judge Rubin, writing for the court, found the East Texas9 case to be
determinative." In both cases the class was not certified at trial, and on
appeal it was concluded that the named plaintiffs were not proper
representatives for the class. Like Rodriguez, Satterwhite was not the
victim of discrimination, but rather had been denied employment
because of her conflict of interest. Thus, she was not a member of the
class at the time of the appeal, and was not even a member at the time
of the filing of her suit.9 Because of this "lack of nexus" 2 she was not a
proper class representative, and that defect was "fatal."93 The Fifth Cir-
cuit had been reversed in its handling of East Texas on this very point, '
and the court was not going to repeat that error.
Certification was, therefore, properly denied even though the district
court erred in not holding an evidentiary hearing. The court also blamed
Satterwhite for this error because "plaintiff had the opportunity to
avoid that error by timely seeking a hearing."'95 Moreover, once cer-
tification was denied without a hearing, plaintiff could have moved to
have the error corrected by the trial court.
Four circuit judges, however, dissented from the court's decision and
pointed out the cul-de-sac into which the court had forced the plaintiff."
When Satterwhite tried to appeal her denied class certification, she was
faced with the recent Supreme Court decision in Coopers & Lybrand v.
Livesay which ruled that such appeals must wait until after a final judg-
ment on the plaintiff's individual claims. 7 In keeping with Coopers, she
withdrew her appeal and filed it following her loss on the merits. The ap-
pellate court then used her loss to deny her review. The trial court had
found that she had not suffered any discrimination so she could not be a
member of the class that she sought to represent. Thus, the judgment in
her personal suit foreclosed her from appealing the denial of class cer-
tification. While such a determination on the merits was not supposed to
enter into the certifying of the class, it was impossible after the judg-
87 Id. at 991.
88 Id.
'9 431 U.S. 395 (1977). See notes 37-42 supra and accompanying text.
578 F.2d 987, 991.
9' Id. at 992.
92 Id.
93 Id.
9 Id.
Id. at 995 n.10.
Id. at 990-99.
17 See notes 49-54 supra and accompanying text.
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ment not to consider it." The circuit court had deprived her of her right
to appeal an obvious error on the part of the trial court. She was not
given an evidentiary hearing prior to the certification decision, but that
faulty procedure was to be left unremedied while she was trapped by
her mooted status. Justifiably outraged, Satterwhite appealed this deci-
sion to the Supreme Court who eventually remanded it" for recon-
sideration in light of its 1980 decisions in Roper"' and Geraghty."'
While the Fifth Circuit did not allow Satterwhite to appeal for the
above reasons, it acknowledged that under certain circumstances ap-
peals by mooted plaintiffs could be permitted."2 As a prerequisite to
such appeals the court required that a hearing be held on certification
and that certification be improperly denied. Using the record made at
the hearing, the appellate court could rule on the maintainability of the
class action without speculating. Moreover, if a hearing were held, the
named plaintiff would not share in the error for failure to certify the
class as had happened in Satterwhite. Having established this criteria,
Judge Rubin was ready to use it the next day as the basis for his opin-
ion in Roper v. Consurve, Inc.108
II. Deposit Nat'! Guaranty Bank v. Roper
A. The Fifth Circuit Decision'.
Two "Bank Americard" holders sued the bank that had issued their
credit cards on behalf of themselves and all other Mississippi holders.
Their action alleged that the charges on the cards were usurious.' The
578 F.2d 987, 996 n.11.
" On remand (445 U.S. 940 (1980)) to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the
case was remanded to the district court where it is presently pending. 634 F.2d
231 (5th Cir. 1981).
100 445 U.S. 326 (1980).
101 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
102 578 F.2d 987, 995 n.10.
101 578 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1978).
10, Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd sub nom.,
Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980).
" The bank divided the holders into ten separate groups, called cycles, and
posted their accounts on ten days a month. Each customer was allowed thirty
days within which to pay his account without a service charge, but if full payment
was not received, the customer was billed 11/20% of the unpaid portion on his next
bill. The actual finance charges paid by each customer varied because the same
11/2 0 service charge was assessed against the unpaid balance regardless of when
the actual charge slips were received. Thus, a charge slip received the last day of
the billing period was subject to the same rate as an item received the first day
of the billing cycle. Under these circumstances plaintiffs alleged that the monthly
service charge resulted in an effective annual interest rate that was usurious
under Mississippi law. 578 F.2d at 1109.
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trial court declined to confer class status on the suit."' Subsequently the
bank without admitting liability offered each representative plaintiff
the full amount of damages that he could have recovered. Both plaintiffs
refused to accept the payment, and the money was deposited with the
court which then entered judgment over the named plaintiffs' objec-
tions.
On appeal, the bank argued that the named plaintiffs lacked standing
to appeal the denied class certification. They had been compensated,
and judgment had been entered so that their claims had been mooted.
With an angry gruffness the court gave this idea "short shrift. 10 7 A
defendant cannot "short-circuit a class action by paying off the class
representatives either with their acquiescence or . . . against their
will."'08 By filing a class action, the named plaintiffs had assumed a
responsibility to the class, and they could not be "bought off" from
fulfilling that responsibility.
Even if the bank were correct that the named plaintiffs' claims were
moot, the court still felt that the plaintiffs could validly appeal the
denied certification. It cited three instances in which courts had so ruled.
In the first, a member of a putative class had appealed the certification
issue despite the fact that the named plaintiffs' claims had been found
without merit."' In the second, a plaintiff who won in the trial court was
allowed to appeal denied certification."0 Lastly, an individual plaintiff
who lost on the merits could appeal concerning certification."' Following
these cases, the court found Roper and Hudgins able appellants for cer-
tification.
The court next turned to policy reasons for allowing the mooted plain-
tiffs' appeal. At this point Judge Rubin referred to his opinion of the
previous day, Satterwhite,"' in which he had briefly outlined the cir-
cumstances under which mooted plaintiffs might appeal. Without such
100 The district court ruled that putative class representatives had failed to
satisfy requirements of FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). See note 2 supra.
101 578 F.2d at 1110.
100 Id.
'" United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977) (in an employment
discrimination suit after named plaintiffs were denied class certification and
were awarded relief, intervention by other class members was permitted).
"Ia Gelman v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 556 F.2d 699 (3d Cir. 1977) (plaintiff
had standing to appeal denial of class action treatment as representative of the
potential class even after he had prevailed in the district court).
"' Horn v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 555 F.2d 270 (10th Cir. 1977)
(district court denied both class certification and Horn's individual claims of
discrimination; appellate court found Horn could still represent class on appeal of
denied certification since he continued as employee of the defendant and had a
continuing interest in the outcome of the case).
112 578 F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1978). See notes 102-03 supra and accompanying
text.
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an exception as Satterwhite described, he noted, the defendant could
escape liability to the class despite judicial error in the certification rul-
ing. Then, intervention would be left as the sole means to save such a
suit from terminatihg. Since, however, other putative class members
would not be notified of the failure to certify the class,"' they would not
intervene and pursue the appeal. The court firmly declared, "[rieview of
alleged judicial error ought not be foreclosed so fortuitously."1 '
As for the Article III requirement of a live controversy, the court felt
that the questioned maintainability of the class action constituted a
viable issue and that the named plaintiffs had a personal stake in the
resolution of that issue. Primarily, their stake arose from their objec-
tions to the settlement. They were adequate representatives for the
suit, possessing that "nexus" with the class that Satterwhite had
lacked."5
To the Fifth Circuit Roper appeared to satisfy all the criteria that it
had established for mooted plaintiffs in Satterwhite."6 Yet as Judge
Thornberry wrote in his special concurrence," 7 it was not truly
necessary for the court to address the mootness question in such
"sweeping dicta."' 8 These named plaintiffs had vigorously objected to
the compromise offer and had refused to accept payment. The court
could have as easily declared that their claims were therefore still "live"
and justiciable. For the defendant a decision on those grounds would
have equally merited an appeal. The defendant did not want to litigate a
class action that would subject it to liability for 90,000 possible claims."9
If the appellate court had ignored the mootness issue, it would have
oversimplified the case for the bank's future appeal to the Supreme
Court. The bank would then have only to prove the named plaintiffs'
claims to be moot to overcome that issue. If the Court found the claims
moot, it could stop there and choose to ignore the question of appeals by
mooted plaintiffs. By expanding its decision to include the mootness
issue, the Circuit was specifically drawing the Court's attention to the
issue and demanding the fullest adjudication that could be given to the
case.
"' The court commented that under a Second Circuit ruling in Pearson v.
Ecological Science Corp., 522 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 912
(1976), putative class members need not be notified of individual compromises
and thus may not know that the class is without a representative plaintiff.
578 F.2d 1106, 1111.
578 F.2d 987, 991.
11 See id. at 995 n.10 and at 996 n.11.
11 Id. at 1116 (Thornberry, J., concurring).
118 Id.
"g During the suit period, there were approximately 90,000 credit card
holders.
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B. The Supreme Court Decision"
1. The Majority Opinion
On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Fifth Cir-
cuit. Chief Justice Burger wrote the opinion of the Court while Justices
Rehnquist, Stevens, and Blackmun concurred, and Justices Powell and
Stewart dissented. The Court had granted certiorari in the case to con-
sider only one issue, "whether a tender to named plaintiffs . . . of the
amounts claimed in their individual capacities, followed by the entry of
judgment in their favor on the basis of that tender, over their objection,
moots the case and terminates their right to appeal the denial of class
certification.""' The Court acknowledged that the split in the circuits
necessitated its resolution of this issue.
As the first step in its analysis, the Court identified the three in-
terests to be examined for justiciability in the class action context.
First, the interest of the named plaintiffs must be considered in two
aspects: (1) the personal stake of the named plaintiffs, and (2) their
responsibility to represent the class. Second, the rights of putative class
members must be viewed in their role as intervenors. Lastly, the
responsibility of the district court to protect the absent class is involved
since that court must monitor the actions of the parties before it. While
realizing that these three interests are interrelated, the Court felt that
the narrow issue required "consideration only of the private interest of
the named plaintiffs.""
The Court then turned to the critical inquiry of whether the private
interests of the named plaintiffs had in fact been mooted. Their original
complaint asserted a real injury from the alleged usurious charges and
satisfied the case or controversy requirement of Article III. They had
chosen to present their claims in the form of a class action which was a
procedural device "ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims.
Should these substantive claims become moot . .. by the settlement of
all personal claims .... the court retains no jurisdiction over the con-
troversy of the individual plaintiffs.'2 3
To resolve this question, the Court looked to the facts of the case. The
named plaintiffs had never accepted the tendered settlement, and judg-
ment had been entered without their consent. 12 So long as the named
Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980).
"' Id. at 327.
" Id. at 331-32.
"2 Id. at 332.
"u At this point the Court noted that the district court had certain respon-
sibilities to the putative class even before certification. In a case such as Roper
the trial court should provide an opportunity for intervention by another member
of the putative class. Id. at 332 n.5. The Fifth Circuit, however, had already fore-
seen the problem that such intervention could cause in a case like Roper. The
1981]
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plaintiffs retained an economic interest in class certification, their
private interests were not mooted. Such an interest was manifested by
the plaintiffs "desire to shift to successful class litigants a portion of
[the] fees and expenses ... incurred in this litigation.""28 Moreover, the
Court declared that a confession of judgment by defendants on less than
all the issues could not moot an entire case.
Federal appellate practice permitted appeals from an adverse ruling
collateral to the judgment on the merits by parties who had prevailed at
trial as long as the parties retained a personal stake in the appeal. The
judgment in this case had been rendered at "an intermediate stage of
litigation"'28 which was quite different from a final judgment. The latter
created "definitive mootness"'' 7 and ousted the case from federal
jurisdiction while the former did not in all cases terminate the right to
appeal. To explain this principle, the Court used a 1939 patent suit, Elec-
trical Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co.' In that case the defend-
ants appealed a decision that decreed the patent valid but dismissed the
infringement question. Since the original suit had concerned infringe-
ment and the adjudication of the patent's validity was immaterial to the
suit's disposition, the Supreme Court had ruled that on appeal the
defendants were entitled to reformation of the decree. Policy considera-
tions dictated permitting the defendants, even though they had pre-
vailed at trial, to appeal the judgment. The Roper case was similar, the
Court explained, because the denial of class certification was a pro-
cedural ruling, "collateral to the merits of a litigation, that [was] ap-
pealable after the entry of final judgment."'-
Not only could named plaintiffs appeal after the entry of final judg-
ment, but they could seek discretionary interlocutory appeals under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b).'" The Court remarked that in Coopers & Lybrand v.
defendant could easily afford to settle with each intervenor and continue to moot
the action until interest in the case disappeared. Id. at 1106, 1111.
125 445 U.S. 326, 334 n.6.
"' Id. at 335.
127 Id.
128 307 U.S. 241 (1939).
"9 445 U.S. 326, 336.
1- 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1958) reads:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not other-
wise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such
order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substan-
tial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from
the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litiga-
tion, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals may
thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such
order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the
order: Provided, however, that application shall not stay proceedings in
the district court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a
judge thereof shall so order.
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Livesay"I it had held that class certification rulings "did not fall within
that narrow category of circumstances where appeal was allowed prior
to final judgment as a matter of right under 28 U.S.C. § 1291."'82 That rul-
ing did not, however, preclude motions under section 1292(b) which
could substantially save time and resources.
Coopers maintained that a class certification question could be raised
on appeal after final judgment on the merits. The Court stated that it
thought Coopers had made that point clear although there was no extended
discussion included on it. The Court had relied, in Coopers, on United
Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald,' a case in which the named plaintiff had
won on the merits. "The McDonald Court assumed that the named plain-
tiff would have been entitled to appeal a denial of class certification."'"
In its concluding dicta the Court discussed the policy reasons behind
the use of class actions and emphasized both their advantages and disad-
vantages. Since plaintiffs could expect certain benefits' 5 from a class ac-
tion, the district court's ruling on certification assumed tremendous
significance. Like the Fifth Circuit, the Court felt that sound judicial ad-
ministration in this case demanded that plaintiffs be granted the right
to appeal. Otherwise, defendants might be encouraged to "buy off" the
named plaintiffs in the hope of avoiding class suits. Moreover, without
such an appeal option, plaintiffs might engage in "forum shopping," try-
ing to locate a district judge sympathetic to class litigation. The Court
wanted to discourage such conduct and strongly advocated "the wise
use of judicial resources.""'3 In formulating the standards that govern
appeals of procedural rulings, courts must therefore have a certain
latitude. Based on the facts and policy considerations that it had
delineated, the Court held that the named plaintiffs were permitted to
appeal the adverse ruling on certification.
2. The Concurring OpinTjons
Three concurring opinions 37 were filed to present the views of
justices who did not agree fully with the dicta of Chief Justice Burger's
opinion. In the first Justice Rehnquist took issue with the Court's deci-
1" 437 U.S. 463 (1978). See notes 49-54 supra and accompanying text.
112 445 U.S. 326, 336 n.8.
13 432 U.S. 385 (1977). See note 109 supra.
Nu 445 U.S. 326, 338.
" A class action could reduce the costs of litigation by allocating them among
the class members. Also, for the small claimants like Roper and Hudgins whose
damages totaled jointly $1,006, it would be harder to find an attorney willing to
pursue their suit without the motivation of a contingent fee based on an entire
class' damages rather than on an individual's damages. Id. at 338 n.9.
'd Id. at 340.
137 Id. at 340, 342, 344.
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sion in Geraghty,' which was handed down on the same day. He reluc-
tantly agreed with the Court in Roper because of the precedents set in
past cases."3 9 For Rehnquist the Court's previous decisions concerning
the issue had been "muddled and inconsistent,""' and the Court's pre-
sent opinion did not clarify them.
The Roper case, Justice Rehnquist explained, could fall within the ex-
ception allowed by Sosna.'. and Gerstein"' for cases "capable of repeti-
tion, yet evading review." If the Court required the named plaintiffs in
class actions to accept a tender of their individual claims, then defend-
ants could repeatedly moot the case before litigation. As long as the
Court did not mandate and plaintiffs did not accept the offer of tender,
the case was not moot since a live controversy existed. Accordingly,
Justice Rehnquist joined in the Court's opinion.
Justice Stevens focused his concurrence on refuting the dissent of
Justice Powell. While Justice Powell maintained that the named plain-
tiffs were "the only plaintiffs arguably present in court,""' Justice
Stevens contended that "when a proper class action complaint [was] filed,
the absent members of the class [were to] be considered parties to the
case or controversy at least for the limited purpose of the court's Arti-
cle III jurisdiction."'" Until the certification issue had been terminated
by a final determination, the members of the putative class remained
parties and provided the viable controversy needed for justiciability.
Because these parties have been unnamed, it may have been thought
that their claims automatically became moot with the claims of the
mooted plaintiffs. While the status of unnamed members has been dif-
ficult to define accurately, the Court had labelled them as "parties in in-
terest""5 as long ago as 1853. This concept of absent, but interested, par-
ties originated much earlier than the certification requirement which
was added in the 1968 amendment of Rule 23.146 Why, Justice Stevens
queried, should the more recent procedural requirement even raise this
'8 445 U.S. 388 (1980). Justice Rehnquist joined in Justice Powell's dissent in
Geraghty, but he took this opportunity to highlight the differences between
Geraghty and Roper. Geraghty did not fit within the framework of precedents
that the Court had established while Roper satisfied the requirements of these
cases.
"s Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); Pugh v. Gerstein, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
140 445 U.S. 326, 341.
141 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
"1 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
,43 445 U.S. 326, 342.
144 Id.
,4' The Court used this phrase in Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288
(1853), one of the earliest class actions in the federal courts.
,' Prior to 1968, Rule 23 did not require the trial court's certification in order
to maintain a class action.
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issue of status which the Court had for so long considered as uncon-
troversial?
The real question in cases such as Roper and Geraghty, Justice
Stevens wrote, was "whether the named plaintiff [continued] to be a pro-
per class representative for the purpose of appealing the adverse class
determination.""'1 In terms of that limited role, the Justice found that
the named plaintiffs clearly remained appropriate representatives of
the class. Since such a ruling conflicted with the Court's decision in
Jacobs, he rebuffed that decision and asserted "that a remand on the
class issue would have been a more appropriate resolution" '148 in that case.
In the third concurrence Justice Blackmun briefly wrote that he not
only agreed with the Court, but felt that the Court's decision was too
narrow. He indicated that appealability should not be limited to those
cases in which the named plaintiff's personal stake consisted of the
recovery of his attorney's fees. In Blackmun's view the ruling on class
certification stands as a separate, litigatible issue "which [did] not
become moot just because the named plaintiffs suit on the merits [was]
mooted."" 9
3. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Powell, who was joined by Justice Stewart, wrote a lengthy
dissent."5 To him the case was moot, and the Court's "attempted solu-
tion . . . [departed] from settled principles of Article III
jurisprudence." '151 The tender offered by the defendant mooted the named
plaintiffs' claims. At the time of the appeal no one other than these
plaintiffs was present in the courtroom. The class had not been certified,
and as precedents such as Jacobs'52 ruled, the named plaintiffs had no
continuing personal stake in the outcome. As for the majority opinion's
reliance on Electrical Fittings,"3 Justice Powell found the analogy to be
totally inappropriate. In the earlier case "a limited appeal was allowed
because the petitioner himself was prejudiced by the inclusion of an un-
necessary and adverse finding in a generally favorable decree.'l" The
effect of denied certification on the plaintiffs in this case bore no such
prejudice. Moreover, policy considerations by themselves did not merit
the disregarding of Article III requirements.
147 445 U.S. 326, 343-44.
"4' 420 U.S. 128 (1975). See notes 20-21 supra and accompanying text.
19 445 U.S. 326, 344.
5 Id. at 344-59.
151 Id. at 358.
152 420 U.S. 128 (1975). See notes 20-21 supra and accompanying text.
307 U.S. 241 (1939).
"4 445 U.S. 326, 348.
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Instead of ruling that an appeal could be permitted by mooted plain-
tiffs, Justice Powell offered the Court several alternative solutions. In-
terlocutory appeals under section 1292(b)'5 could be made, or Congress
could enact legislation to permit appeals under section 1291.5' The
district court could be required to give notice to putative class members
of the settlement between the named plaintiffs and defendants, thus
enabling them to intervene. ' Lastly, Congress could pass legislation
providing other solutions to the problem. '
The ruling of the Court was especially unsatisfactory because of its
repercussions." 9 It would create a situation of "one-way intervention"
for class members. If the named plaintiff, after an adverse certification
ruling, prevailed on the merits of his own case and then appealed and
obtained a reversal of the certification ruling, the putative class
members could subsequently take advantage of the favorable judgment
without assuming the risk of being bound by an unfavorable judgment.
In Justice Powell's opinion, the significant problem that such a policy
could create militated against the Court's decision.
C. Analysis of the Supreme Court Decision
The Court had purposely issued Roper as the first of its two decisions
on a mooted plaintiff's right to appeal denied class certification.
Geraghty, which was delivered second, relied on Roper to give it a
stronger precedential base. Yet Roper was not a strong decision. Both
Justice Rehnquist, who concurred in Roper, and Chief Justice Burger,
who wrote the Roper opinion, later joined in the dissent in Geraghty,'
indicating that to them Roper was a narrow decision to be limited to its
facts.
'' See note 130 supra and accompanying text.
15 Coopers prevented appeals under § 1291. See notes 49-62 supra and accom-
panying text.
" Under Rule 23(e) the district court is required to give notice of a proposed
dismissal or compromise to all members of the class. In Roper, however, this re-
quirement had been avoided because the class had never been certified. Instead,
the court could apply Rule 68 governing offers of judgment and did not need to
give notice to putative class members.
"5 For instance, at the time of this decision a bill was before Congress (H.R.
5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)) to create a new federal right of action for
damage claims too small to justify individual lawsuits. A hearing was held on this
bill in the House on April 17, 1980, and no further action has been taken by Con-
gress.
"I9 "One-way intervention" is, however, routinely permitted in class action
litigation. Its repercussions were considered in cases such as Katz v. Carte Blan-
che Corp., 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974), and were found
to be minimal. In fact, the Third Circuit favored such a procedure in Katz
because it saved the time and expense involved in serving notice on class
members until after a violation was established. Id. at 760.
"- 445 U.S. 388, 409 (1980).
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The circumstances that helped the plaintiffs in Roper overcome
mootness lay in their refusal to accept the settlement offer made by the
bank. When the district court entered judgment over Roper's objection,
it was not the usual type of final judgment. An appeal of the judgment
entry could easily find it to be erroneous. In that instance, the plaintiffs'
claims would not have been mooted. Moreover, their refusal to accept
the offered tender gave them a continuing personal interest in the suit.
Aside from that incentive, the desire to allocate their legal costs be-
tween themselves and the putative class, if the case succeeded on the
merits, provided an economic stake for a continuing "live" controversy.
Yet, as the petitioners in Geraghty noted, this situation was different
from one in which the named plaintiffs claim expired due to time. If
their case was mooted, it was by the trial court's judgment, not by their
satisfying a time requirement such as state residency or a prison
sentence."'1 All these facts cumulated into a unique pattern which al-
lowed the Court to rule that the plaintiffs still had a private stake in the
litigation. As Justice Blackmun noted in his concurrence,' it was a
limited holding and with the Court's emphasis on the facts, its future ap-
plicability was weakened. Courts find such narrow cases easy to
distinguish because the identical facts rarely arise again. Any deviation,
then, can be sufficient to merit a different ruling.
If the Court had at least used the established mootness cases in the
class action area to reach its decision, its holding would have appeared
broader and more firmly based. Curiously, Sosna was not even men-
tioned. The Court did not try to justify its conclusion in light of the flex-
ible holdings in Sosna or Gerstein, nor did it try to refute cases like
Jacobs and East Texas which appeared irreconcilable with its holding.
Instead, it turned to a case outside the class action context and relied on
Electrical Fittings.6' As Justice Powell commented in his dissent, 64 the
analogy was inappropriate. An appeal to reform the decree in the patent
suit was allowed because the trial court had erroneously adjudicated an
issue that was immaterial to the cause of litigation. The Court carefully
delineated the type of appeal it was permitting in that case; it was not
applicable to a party appealing from "a judgment or decree in his favor,
for the purpose of obtaining a review of findings he deems erroneous,
which are not necessary to support the decree."'65 Certainly Roper's ap-
peal fell into that category. Irrelevancy was the rationale in Electrical
Fittings, and its holding was irrelevant to the concerns of mooted plain-
tiffs trying to appeal an adverse certification ruling. By using such a
... Sosna's and Geraghty's claims were both mooted by the expiration of time.
162 445 U.S. 326, 344. See note 134 supra and accompanying text.
163 307 U.S. 241 (1939).
445 U.S. 326, 348-49.
16 307 U.S. at 242.
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poor analogy and obscure case, Chief Justice Burger had only hurt the
value of his opinion.
In his discussion of Electrical Fittings, Chief Justice Burger spoke of
the difference between "definitive mootness of a case or controversy,
which ousts the jurisdiction of the federal courts and requires dismissal
of the case, and a judgment in favor of a party at an intermediate stage
of litigation, which does not in all cases terminate the right to appeal.""1 '
"Definitive mootness," it can be assumed, refers to the strict Article III
requirement of case or controversy. The other type of mootness is "flex-
ible," insofar as it permits an appeal after the plaintiff has prevailed on
the merits. Without formally acknowledging the existence of the doc-
trine of "flexible mootness," the Court was, nevertheless, applying a
form of it in this case. In Geraghty, Justice Blackmun devoted great
care to tracing the history of the doctrine,167 but Chief Justice Burger
chose to ignore the past judicial history. By failing to build a foundation
for the mootness exception and by failing to recognize it, the Court has
tried to downplay its decision. It was willing to let Roper appeal given
the facts of his case, but did not want to admit openly that it was
establishing a policy of "flexible mootness" in class certification appeals.
If the Chief Justice's intent had been otherwise, it would not have been
necessary for him to dissent in Geraghty.
While an appeal was to be allowed in this case, the Court, in a foot-
note, '68 suggested that appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) 69 might be used
by named plaintiffs for the certification question. For the Chief Justice
to offer this option to named plaintiffs is startling. When Congress
enacted the Interlocutory Appeals Act of 1958,170 it had added (b) to sec-
tion 1292 to handle interlocutory appeals that arose early in the course
of litigation and (1) involved a controlling question of law, (2) presented
substantial ground for difference of opinions, and (3) would advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation. The legislative history of section
1292(b) indicated, however, that Congress did not want to encourage
piecemeal appeals.' Therefore, it would be a truly exceptional case that
would both satisfy the requirements of the statute and merit this
special treatment. For the Chief Justice to state that the denial of class
certification would qualify for such an appeal invited such appeals, yet
their maintainability was questionable under the statute. As a solution
to the mooted plaintiffs problem, it was no more certain than was his
appeal under the doctrine of "flexible mootness."'' 2
1" 445 U.S. 326, 335.
167 445 U.S. 388, 395-401.
445 U.S. 326, 336 n.8.
169 See note 130 supra.
170 Pub. L. No. 85-919, 72 Stat. 1770 (1958).
171 32 AM. JUR. 2d Federal Procedure § 349 (1980).
... Moreover, the circuit courts had previously rejected the routine use of sec-
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Lastly, the Chief Justice gave the policy reasons for allowing Roper's
appeal. He did not want to encourage defendants to "buy off" named
plaintiffs, and he did not want the named plaintiffs to engage in "forum
shopping." Policy considerations such as these cannot be narrowly con-
fined. They extend to the entire realm of class actions involving mooted
plaintiffs who wish to appeal denied certification. In such a limited opin-
ion as Roper they appear incongruous. Without a Court-approved "flexi-
ble mootness" exception, named plaintiffs would be careful to pick a
sympathetic judge rather than risk denied certification and a subse-
quent loss of appeal due to mootness. Roper would only help them if
their facts were identical to those in Roper. Again, if the Chief Justice
truly believed in these policy considerations, he would have joined in
the Geraghty opinion as a more effective preventative, or he would have
written his holding more broadly.
III. U.S. Parole Commission v. Geraghty
A. The Third Circuit Decision"'
According to U.S. Parole Commission guidelines, each prisoner had a
predetermined time to be served before he could become eligible for
parole. This time was computed by assigning a rating to each class of of-
fenses and a "parole prognosis score" to each prisoner, and then combin-
ing these numbers on a grid which identified the time span to be served.
Geraghty' challenged the validity of these guidelines on constitutional
grounds and brought the suit as a class action on behalf of all federal
prisoners who were or who would become eligible for parole. 75 At trial
the class was not certified, 7 ' and Geraghty's individual suit was dis-
missed by summary judgment.' Geraghty then appealed from both rul-
ings, but before oral arguments were heard, his sentence expired and he
was released.
The Third Circuit delivered a well-reasoned, lengthy opinion allow-
ing Geraghty, a mooted plaintiff, the right to appeal the refusal of class
status. The Parole Commission based its contention on Jacobs,' assert-
ing that the absence of a certified class and the mootness of the named
tion 1292(b) in class certification appeals. "Other overriding legal issues" must be
present, according to the Third Circuit in Link v. Mercedes-Benz of N. America,
Inc., 550 F.2d 860, 863 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977).
11 579 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1978).
"I Geraghty, a Chicago policeman, was convicted in 1973 of conspiracy to com-
mit extortion and false statements to the grand jury. Id.
t7 445 U.S 388, 393.
176 The trial court denied certification because it felt that Geraghty's claims
were not typical of the class that he purported to represent. Therefore, the
prerequisite of FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) was not met. 579 F.2d 238, at 252.
'.. 429 F. Supp. 737 (M.D. Pa. 1977).
'7' 420 U.S. 128 (1975). See notes 20-22 supra and accompanying text.
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plaintiff automatically rendered the case not justiciable for lack of a
"live" controversy. The court easily brushed aside this argument, citing
the Supreme Court's holdings in both prior and subsequent cases, and
limiting Jacobs' holding to its facts.9
Three cases, in particular, refuted the defendant's reliance on
Jacobs."' First, Geraghty's action strongly resembled Gerstein which
had challenged pretrial detention. In both cases the named plaintiffs'
claims became moot before their appeals, but the court could be assured
of an ongoing class suffering the alleged injury. The Supreme Court had
permitted Gerstein to continue as class representative, and Geraghty
deserved similar treatment. In the earlier case, however, the class had
been certified at trial, and such was not the case in Geraghty."'
Two Supreme Court cases 82 dealing with intervention in class actions
resolved this problem. In both instances the named plaintiffs were
denied class certification at trial. Soon thereafter the claims of these
plaintiffs were mooted, yet the Court still allowed intervenors to pursue
the actions. The lack of a live controversy on the part of the named
plaintiffs did not terminate these suits, and similarly Geraghty's case
need not be terminated by his mootness.
In all three of the above Supreme Court cases, "the lack of certifica-
tion . . . [did] not inevitably require dismissal, if the elements of
justiciability [were] otherwise established"'8 3 by the continuation of a
concrete dispute and adequate representation. Likewise, in the instant
case the existence of prisoners subject to the parole guidelines assured
the continuation of a live controversy. Furthermore, the Third Circuit
recognized that flexible mootness involved "discretionary elements"''
to which the court could "ascribe weight to reasons of policy."'81 5 In this
178 579 F.2d 238, 250.
181 420 U.S. 103 (1975). See notes 24-30 supra and accompanying text.
"1 579 F.2d 238, 249-51.
182 Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976) (controversy involving prison
regulations was not certified as a class action and named plaintiffs died or were
released prior to appeal; subsequent intervention by another prisoner was al-
lowed); see United Airlines v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977).
113 579 F.2d 238, 250-51.
I Id. at 251.
1"5 Id. at 246. The court discussed in detail the contours of the mootness doc-
trine. The doctrine was found to consist of two parts. The first was "the mandate
of Article III, which provides that the power of the judiciary is limited to cases or
controversies" and the second the "more flexible considerations of policy," which
encompasses three questions: (1) whether a legal controversy exists sufficient to
show that the case is not hypothetical; (2) whether the controversy affects an in-
dividual in such a concrete manner as to permit reasoned adjudication; and (3)
whether the parties have sufficient functional adversity to sharpen the issues for
court resolution. For a more thorough discussion of the flexibility of mootness,
see Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 88 HARV. L. REV. 373
(1974).
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case the court found four such elements.'
First, Geraghty's suit resembled those actions labelled "capable of
repetition, yet evading review." '187 Prisoners like the named plaintiff
would inevitably be discharged before they could fully litigate their
challenge of the parole rules' legality. The court said: "This alone is a
factor weighing heavily in favor of justiciability." 8 Second, the court
confronted the problem of denied certification. In the three Supreme
Court cases above, the class had been certified by the trial court, but
Geraghty had been refused certification. Following Gardner,89 the court
realized that mooted plaintiffs were being denied the possibility of
review of adverse class determinations. In its third consideration, the
court established a requirement for such cases to qualify for the
mootness exception that the court was proposing. The attorneys in the
case must have continued to press the suit without "any diminution of
vigor in their efforts despite the release of [the named plaintiff]." 9 ' Such
effort in this case, combined with the attempted intervention of another
class member,"' presented "a prima facie case of functional
adversity."'92 Such adversity clearly satisified the basic requirements of
the mootness doctrine. Lastly, the court reasoned that the case was not
tied solely to Geraghty. Even without him, the interests of the putative
class remained the same, as did the procedures and regulations of the
Parole Commission. While the named plaintiff functioned as a
figurehead for the class, the class existed as a separate entity on its
own. In the court's opinion Geraghty was, therefore, a proper party to
appeal the denied class status.
The court's analysis appeared sound although it could not find much
support from other circuits.9 If the court had so desired, it could have
buttressed its thinking with Sosna.94 Not only did that case provide the
M 579 F.2d 238, 251-52.
18 This case was not a perfect example of actions "capable of repetition, yet
evading review" because some prisoners would have sentences sufficiently long
to permit them to fully pursue a challenge to the parole rules' legality. Id. at 251.
189 Id.
189 437 U.S. 478 (1978). See notes 55-62 supra and accompanying text. The
Third Circuit felt responsible for this decision because it was their holding (559
F.2d 209 (3d Cir. 1977)) that the Supreme Court had affirmed in Gardner. Surpris-
ingly the court did not also mention the Coopers decision handed down the same
day as Gardner. In that case named plaintiffs lost their right to appeal under §
1291. See notes 49-54 supra and accompanying text.
190 579 F.2d 238, 252.
191 Becher, another prisoner like Geraghty, had applied to intervene in the
case after Geraghty had appealed to the Third Circuit. Because the district court
was then without jurisdiction in the case, it denied his request. Id. at 245 n.21.
19 Id. at 252.
193 Id. at 251 n.49.
19 419 U.S. 393 (1975). See notes 12-18 supra and accompanying text.
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initial exception for injuries "capable of repetition, yet evading review,"
but it also acknowledged that the class had an existence of its own,
apart from that of the mooted plaintiff. Moreover, despite the
murkiness that the mootness issue brought to the case, the Third Cir-
cuit clearly saw the heart of the problem. An improper denial of class
certification could become a bar to the adjudication of an otherwise con-
stitutionally justiciable controversy. "Flexible mootness" needed to be
expanded to allow mooted plaintiffs the opportunity to appeal the denial
of class certification, and the Third Circuit had strongly advocated its
position. Nevertheless, it was not unexpected that the Parole Commis-
sion would appeal to the Supreme Court.
B. The Supreme Court Decision"9 5
1. The Majority Opinion
Justice Blackmun, who delivered the opinion of the Court,
wholeheartedly endorsed the Third Circuit's handling of the issue.
Because he knew that "the question at hand [was] one of first impression
and thus . . . unprecedented,"'"" he proceeded through his analysis in a
careful, step-by-step manner. First, he considered the concept of
mootness itself and explained how its flexible nature was first re-
cognized by the Court in Flast v. Cohen.'97 Mootness served a definite
judicial function by limiting federal litigation to "live" issues or issues
presented by parties with a cognizable interest in the outcome. Since
the controversy over the parole guidelines was clearly "live" for
members of the proposed class, the Court's analysis concentrated on the
personal stake requirement.
To build his argument, Justice Blackmun traced the Court's treat-
ment of this requirement in the class action context. Two lines of cases
existed: The first, a "flexible" group, had its roots in Sosna'98 and Gers-
tein,'99 and the second, characterized as "less flexible," ' followed
Jacobs."0 ' The latter was not dispositive in this case and was
distinguishable.2 In Sosna and Gerstein, however, the Court saw a
"flexible mootness" that had been extended to named plaintiffs. Neither
plaintiff had a personal stake in the outcome in the traditional sense, yet
445 U.S. 388 (1980).
Id. at 404 n.11.
,9 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
100 419 U.S. 393 (1975). See notes 12-18 supra and accompanying text.
'9 420 U.S. 103 (1975). See notes 24-30 supra and accompanying text.
445 U.S. 388, 400 n.7.
201 420 U.S. 128 (1975). See notes 20-22 supra and accompanying text.
22 The Court found these cases distinguishable because the parties in them
had not suggested "relation back" of class certification and had appealed on the
merits without having first obtained class certification. 445 U.S. 388, 400 n.7.
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each represented a "live" controversy which was found to be justiciable.
Geraghty's interest "was precisely the same as" ' 3 that of the named
plaintiffs in Gerstein and certainly merited the same treatment. Even in
appeals of denied class certification the Court had established
precedents "that the proposed class representative who [proceeded] to a
judgment on the merits [might] appeal.""2 One such case was United
Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald"'0 which had inferred that a refusal to certify
was subject to appellate review. The other leading case was Roper2°
which the Court had decided the same day as Geraghty.
The Parole Commission, however, in its appeal, sought to distinguish
the case from Roper. In that case mootness resulted from a judgment
while here it was caused by an expiration of the claim, i.e., Geraghty's
release. Such a distinction was firmly rejected by the Court. Geraghty's
personal stake in the suit did not differ from Roper's in any practical
sense. To apply mootness in a case did not require an analysis of the
type of mootness but rather an issue by issue approach. In a class action
a plaintiff presents two separate issues: (1) the claim on the merits and
(2) the claim that he was entitled to represent the class. Thus, in deter-
mining whether a plaintiff could appeal his certification claim, the court
needed to examine his personal stake in that issue alone. Basically the
plaintiff had a right to certification if his action satisified the prere-
quisites of Rule 23.20 The plaintiff would have desired the certification
because of the benefits that class status would have brought to his suit.
His interest in certification must have been manifested by "vigorous ad-
vocacy"'  of his right. In such an instance the plaintiff's mootness did
not prevent an appeal. He had maintained a claim that offered to the
court "sharply presented issues in a concrete factual setting and self-
interested parties vigorously advocating opposing positions.""2 9 The
denial might, therefore, be appealed by the mooted plaintiff. If the ap-
peal were successful, the district court on remand must then decide
whether the mooted plaintiff or another class member would be the best
representative for the class in its suit on the merits. Within the limited
context of the appeal, however, the Court had declared "flexible
mootness" a workable concept.
During its discourse the Court paused in a lengthy footnote' to
Id. at 400.
Id. at 399.
25 432 U.S. 385 (1977). See notes 109 and 182 supra and accompanying text.
445 U.S. 326 (1980). See notes 204-54 supra and accompanying text.
Such a right was analogous to the private attorney general concept that the
Court in Roper had called a "natural outgrowth" of class actions. 445 U.S. 326,
338.
10 445 U.S. 388, 404.
Id. at 403.
210 Id. at 404 n.11.
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refute the arguments in Justice Powell's dissent. It did not believe that
this case represented a "significant departure" from precedents, and it
restated its reliance on Flast, McDonald and Sosna. While it conceded
that the prior cases were "somewhat confusing . . .and perhaps .. . ir-
reconcilable," '' it pointed out that the basic issue, the Article III re-
quirement for case or controversy, was "riddled with exceptions." '212
Unlike the dissent, the Court did not fear the resulting consequences of
its ruling: "Each case must be decided on its facts.""21 For instance, in
Geraghty the plaintiff had suffered an actual injury as a result of the
defendant's alleged illegal conduct, and this injury satisfied "the for-
malistic personal stake requirement if damages were sought." '' If the
district court had granted the motion for certification, the case would
not have become moot because the class would have had an established,
separate legal status. If the court had erroneously denied the certifica-
tion, it must in the corrected ruling "relate back" to the date of the
original denial. As Gerstein21' had decided, the certification then
"related back" to the case or controversy that existed at that time. This
principle would provide a control mechanism on such appeals. If the
named plaintiff did not have a justiciable issue when he originally asked
for class certification,"6 then he could not, on appeal, escape the
mootness of his situation.
2. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Powell wrote the dissent on his own behalf and on behalf of
three other justices.2 7 In his opinion Powell stated that Geraghty no
longer had "the slightest interest in the injuries alleged in his com-
plaint."2 No class had been identified or certified, so no member of the
putative class could properly bring the issue before the Court. The case,
therefore, lacked the requisite personal stake of a plaintiff and should
have been dismissed as moot.
In particular, Justice Powell rejected two major elements of the ma-
jority decision. To create the concept of "flexible mootness" in a class
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Id.
211 420 U.S. 128 (1975). See notes 20-22 supra and accompanying text.
21" For instance, if Geraghty had filed his motion for certification the day after
he was released, he would have lacked the required personal stake in the out-
come of the case. The "relation back" doctrine looks to the circumstances existing
at the time of the original motion. No exception to the mootness doctrine can be
made if no case or controversy existed at that time.
217 Joining in J. Powell's dissent were Burger, C.J., and Stewart and Rehn-
quist, JJ., 445 U.S. 388, 424.
2 1 445 U.S. 388, 424.
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action context, the Court had misread the cases that it used as
precedents.' None of these cases allowed an appeal from the denial of
class certification without the plaintiff's proof of a personal stake in the
outcome. Thus, it was possible to distinguish Geraghty from Roper
because, in the latter case, plaintiffs at least had the speculative in-
terest in sharing legal costs with the class. Geraghty offered no such
"live" interest in the present case. Moreover, the Court ignored the
"controlling relevance" of cases like Jacobs,"' by calling them "less flex-
ible" holdings. To Justice Powell, these cases were "recent and carefully
considered decisions . . .[which] applied long settled principles of Art.
III jurisprudence." ''
Second, Justice Powell disavowed the Court's splitting a class action
into two separate claims: (1) the claim on the merits, and (2) the claim
that the named plaintiff was entitled to represent the class. The second
claim had no legitimate existence of its own. It was merely a procedural
device with no value other than "to facilitate a favorable resolution of
the case on the merits.""2 2 Discussion of a private stake of the plaintiff in
such a claim was, therefore, centered on "a false dilemma.""22 While
recognizing that the Court had found policy considerations to favor its
flexible mootness doctrine, Justice Powell asserted that the Court had
nevertheless violated the principles of Article III mootness to create an
exception for mooted plaintiffs like Geraghty. Policy considerations
alone could not provide a plaintiff when none is before the Court, and
Geraghty, in his view, should have been remanded with instructions to
dismiss the action as moot.
C. Analysis of the Supreme Court Decision
In his concurrence in Roper, Justice Stevens wrote that that for the
limited purpose of appealing denied class certification the named plain-
tiffs in Geraghty and Roper were appropriate class representatives.2 4
Justice Blackmun had elaborated on that principle and shaped it into
the holding in Geraghty. The Court's granting of this right of appeal to
mooted plaintiffs logically followed from its earlier decisions of "flexible
mootness." Without such an exception, as the appellate courts had
noted, an improper denial would prevent the class from adjudicating a
legitimate injury and obtaining needed redress. In its holding the Court
219 Justice Powell reviewed the cases of Sosna, Gerstein, McDonald and
Roper. For the Court's reliance on these cases, see notes 198-201 supra and ac-
companying text.
"o See note 202 supra and accompanying text.
21 445 U.S. 388, 418.
2 Id. at 423.
Id. at 422.
445 U.S. 326, 344.
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had hopefully remedied the situation by giving such a class a chance to
appeal by the plaintiff who had originally brought the suit.
While the opinion was carefully constructed, it nevertheless con-
tained some questionable dicta. The two major problem areas were both
attacked by Justice Powell in his dissent. While it is extremely likely
that Justice Powell would have dissented from the opinion even without
these weak points, 2 5 their existence only served to make his attack
sharper. The first arose from Justice Blackmun's cursory dismissal of
Supreme Court cases that did not fit into his framework, and the second
from the Justice's elevation of a procedural device to the level of a
separate litigable claim.
Justice Blackmun built his analysis slowly so that his arguments
would derive strength from their precedents. First, he examined
mootness and its evolution, then he turned to mootness in the class ac-
tion forum, and in both instances he relied on well-known, influential
cases. Unlike the Roper opinion where Sosna was mysteriously absent,
Geraghty found Sosna repeatedly supportive. Other cases from the post-
Sosna decisions, such as Gerstein and Franks, were cited for their con-
tributions to "flexible mootness." When the Court announced in its con-
cluding remarks that Geraghty and other similarly-situated mooted
plaintiffs could qualify for this relaxed Article III treatment, it seemed
to follow logically from these earlier cases.
Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun failed to clarify the "muddled and in-
consistent" '26 treatment of such plaintiffs. He acknowledged that
another line of cases existed that were "less flexible," but he shrugged
them off after briefly trying to distinguish them. Cases like Jacobs2.7
that did not allow for any flexibility but strictly adhered to Article III
traditional mootness could not be readily distinguished. Usually defend-
ants would argue the Jacobs decision and plaintiffs would refer to the
more permissive cases like Sosna, Gerstein and Franks. Then the ap-
pellate court would pick whichever seemed more persuasive at the time,
producing unpredictable and contradictory holdings. The Court needed
to settle this tension, not just relegate one line of cases to "second
class ' 2 8 status. Even if Jacobs' usefulness was essentially diminished by
its treatment here, the Court never touched on East Texas229 which was
a reaffirmation of the Jacobs' holding. Leaving such a recent precedent
without comment, the Court failed to "wipe the slate clean." 3 ' Justice
I Justice Powell had dissented in all the Court's previous "flexible mootness"
decisions as the Court noted in Geraghty. 445 U.S. 388, 404 n.11.
226 445 U.S. 326, 341.
See notes 20-22 supra and accompanying text.
28 445 U.S. 388, 418. Justice Powell accused the Court of making these "recent
and carefully considered decisions" into "second class precedents." id.
See notes 37-42 supra and accompanying text.
' In his concurrence to Roper, Justice Rehnquist complained that "the Court
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Stevens had also seen this problem in his concurrence to Roper"' and
wrote that Jacobs had probably been decided wrongly. Yet until an opi-
nion either overrules or disapproves these precedents, they will most
likely continue to confuse the lower courts. 32
The second weakness in the Court's opinion lay in its division of a
potential class action into two separately existing claims: one on the
merits and the other on the representation of the class. Justice Powell's
attack of this classification was justified. 33 The second claim depended
on the first for its existence and, moreover, was not an issue, but rather
a procedural device. The Court went on to discuss the personal stake a
named plaintiff must show in the second claim so that his suit would not
be moot. He must have "vigorously" advocated his position and brought
to the court "sharply presented issues in a concrete factual setting.""23 If
he continued to do so through the time of his appeal, then the mootness
of his personal claim on the merits would not moot his appeal. Not only
was this test unnecessary since it rested on the erroneous premise that
class representation was a separate issue with its own personal stake
requirement, but it also placed an unwarranted burden on the mooted
plaintiff.
The Court had a better test but failed to give it the comprehensive
discussion that it deserved. In its footnote reply to the dissent,2 35 the
Court described how the "relation back" doctrine would provide a check
on the appeals of mooted plaintiffs. If the Court had used this doctrine
for its test, it would have avoided the problem created by the division of
the claims. Only the claim on the merits would be brought to court by
the named plaintiff. He would then assert his procedural motion for
class certification. Following the denial of his motion and the adjudica-
tion of his individual claim, he would appeal the adverse ruling. His
claim was now moot, but the Court could allow his appeal to escape
mootness by permitting it to "relate back" to the case or controversy
that existed when he originally filed the certification motion. If he had a
legitimate Article III claim at that time, for the limited purpose of the
appeal, he would be an adequate representative. Such a test would not
require a separate examination by the Court of the mooted plaintiff's
stake in representing the class. He does not have to allege an economic
interest like the Roper plaintiffs nor does he have to describe how in-
today has not cleaned the slate or been successful in ... [replacing] ... the mud-
dled and inconsistent [principles] of the past." 445 U.S. 326, 340-41.
231 Id. at 342 n.1.
Such a result can already be seen in the Fifth Circuit's treatment of Satter-
white on remand. 634 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1981). See notes 237-40 infra and accom-
panying text.
2-3 445 U.S. 388, 419-24.
Id. at 403.
3 Id. at 404 n.11.
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terested he is in the other benefits of class status. The only personal in-
terest that he needs is the one that he brought originally to his claim in
the suit. As the Court noted in its footnote, Gerstein provided a solid
precedent for this test, and the Court could have traced it back further
to "the Sosna footnote." Using this reasoning, this case would become a
direct extension of the "flexible mootness" allowed by those precedents.
While this case did not resolve all the problems of such appeals, it
was a step in the right direction. It had broadened the holding in Roper
so that a mooted plaintiff need not worry about matching facts to that
case. Unlike Roper, it did not ignore its class action precedents.
Although it had the authority that the use of such precedents com-
mands, it did not qualify as an undisputable precedent on its own.
IV. RAMIFICATIONS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
As was noted in the above analysis of Geraghty, the Supreme Court
has not provided the clear guidance that the lower courts would have
hoped for. Conflicting precedents still exist, and it is probably just a
matter of time until another case wends its way through the federal
courts seeking certiorari to settle the uncertainty. The Court's obvious
intent in Geraghty was to enlarge the scope of "flexible mootness" to
allow mooted plaintiffs to appeal denied class certification. In less than a
year it has become obvious that the Court did not succeed as fully as it
may have thought.
As was discussed above in the Geraghty analysis, the Court did not
negate conflicting precedents such as East Texas. After the Court
decided these two cases, it remanded Satterwhite23 to the Fifth Circuit
for reconsideration. In that case the Fifth Circuit had relied on East
Texas as the basis for its opinion. On remand the appellate court was
ordered by the Supreme Court to apply the Supreme Court's decisions
in Roper and Geraghty. Because of a lack of information in the record on
which to base a reconsideration, the Fifth Circuit, in turn, remanded the
case to the district court.23 While the appellate court directed the lower
court to "consider the factors mentioned in Geraghty and Roper,"2 it
also instructed the court to consider East Texas as determinative. As
the dissent"9 by Judge Gee remarked, however, it was an impossible
task to distinguish East Texas or to reconcile it. While the appellate
court probably considered itself fortunate not to be the first court faced
with that task, it will probably encounter it on appeal. No matter what
the district court rules, there will be grounds for appeal because it did
not follow all of the appellate court's instructions. It cannot, as the Fifth
23 Satterwhite v. City of Greenville, 445 U.S. 940 (1980).
23 634 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 232.
' Id. at 232-36.
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Circuit well knows, comply with all of them because of the "tension be-
tween the general thrust of the Court's Geraghty and Roper decisions
and its unanimous decision in East Texas. '4 0
Under East Texas, Satterwhite was found not to be an appropriate
class representative because she did not belong to the purported class.24'
In Geraghty the trial court had similarly found that the named plaintiff
had not suffered an injury typical of the class and could not therefore be
a class representative. Yet the Supreme Court in Geraghty had chosen
to ignore the precedent of East Texas and to allow Geraghty to appeal
on behalf of a class of which he had been found not to be a member. This
inconsistency, as Judge Gee acknowledged, can only be resolved by the
Supreme Court.2
While the Supreme Court has created this uncertain disposition of ap-
peals by mooted plaintiffs, and appears reluctant or unable to "wipe the
slate clean," it could resort to other solutions. This situation has par-
tially resulted from the Court's decisions in Coopers and Gardner when
it ruled that appeals of denied certification must wait until a final judg-
ment has been rendered."' Boyd and Geraghty are examples of plaintiffs
who were trapped without such appeals. Justice Powell in his Roper dis-
sent suggested that Congress pass legislation to make class action ap-
peals an exception to either section 1291 or section 1292(a). Most likely,
Congress would feel that it was unnecessary to enact such a law because
it has already provided a contingency in section 1292(b) to cover such ex-
ceptional circumstances. If the Court felt strongly that it was denying
putative classes their full judicial rights, it could, when an appropriate
case arose, overrule either Coopers or Gardner.
Justice Powell also suggested that the courts use section 1292(b) to
handle such appeals, and Chief Justice Burger endorsed its use in the
majority opinion in Roper. As was discussed above,4 courts have
always applied that statute sparingly. If named plaintiffs began to use it
steadily, the Court may become upset by the number of piecemeal ap-
peals that would consume court time and resources. A similar situation
had caused the Court to stop the appeals of named plaintiffs under sec-
tion 1291 in Coopers.4 5
Of all the possible solutions, the most effective would be the Court's
conforming its cases into an officially approved line. Since the Court
cannot effectively distinguish Jacobs and East Texas, it must either
24 Id. at 236.
241 See notes 86-99 supra and accompanying text.
24 Judge Gee stated: "Perhaps the Court will now overrule, disapprove, or
distinguish [East Texas]; the former two actions, however, are beyond our [the
circuit's] powers and the latter beyond my ability." 634 F.2d 231, 236.
243 See notes 43-62 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 168-70 supra and accompanying text.
245 See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
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disapprove or overrule them. "Flexible mootness" is an established prin-
ciple which the Court should extend to mooted plaintiffs who are other-
wise left without recourse to appeal denied certification. It should not
let this doctrine be defeated or diminished by judicial inconsistency.
V. CONCLUSION
In 1975 the Supreme Court began a policy of "flexible mootness" in
class action cases. Sosna established a valuable precedent, and later
cases such as Gerstein and Franks enlarged upon it. At the same time,
however, another string of cases created by Jacobs and East Texas nar-
rowed it. The Court never resolved the resulting conflict but moved
ahead and added two more opinions in Geraghty and Roper. Those cases
allowed mooted plaintiffs to benefit from "flexible mootness" and to ap-
peal denied class certification. The Court had already revoked the right
of such plaintiffs to interlocutory appeals and was now trying to find a
remedy for their situation. Geraghty, in particular, was the sought-after
solution, but the Court's poor "house-cleaning" reduced its authority. If
the Court cannot distinguish the two different lines of cases in concrete,
comprehensible terms, it must choose which side to follow. Since
Geraghty has brought necessary and justifiable relief to mooted plain-
tiffs, it is hoped that the Court will reaffirm that decision by dispelling
the inconsistencies in its next "flexible mootness" ruling for class ac-
tions.
ENID L. ZAFRAN
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